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Human capital formation is key in efforts to alleviate poverty.   Because education 
is costly, poverty traps emerge.  The poor and less educated demand less schooling for 
their children and remain poor.  The paper addresses household decisions about schooling 
and the role microfinance plays in those decisions through income, risk-coping, gender, 
child-labor, and information effects.  Count regression models are used to examine the 
determinants of schooling achievements for households of microfinance clients, using 
two datasets from Bolivia. The results challenge usual microfinance assumptions in 
program design. 
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The Influence of Microfinance on the Education Decisions of 
Rural Households: Evidence from Bolivia 
 
Increased access to education will be key in any efforts to improve the quality of 
rural life and the welfare of the next generation in developing countries.  Microfinance 
programs have been among components of poverty alleviation strategies that have 
attempted to address this challenge.  The purpose of this paper is to examine some 
channels through which microfinance may exert a positive influence on education 
outcomes.  We identify five channels, designated as income, risk-management, child- 
labor demand, gender, and information effects.   
The paper uses data from two different surveys of the households of clients of 
microfinance organizations (MFOs) in Bolivia.  Based on a theoretical specification that 
explains schooling decisions at the household level, regression models are used to 
examine determinants of education achievements and to make inferences about the 
potential influence of microfinance, through these channels, on those achievements. 
The regression models incorporate a negative binomial specification.  The 
explanatory variables include individual (age, gender), household (siblings, schooling 
levels of household workers, area of cultivated land, poverty), environment (regional 
dummies), empowerment (women’s contribution to household income), and program 
features (length of exposure to microfinance services).   
  2
The results challenge usual assumptions in microfinance programs.  In particular, 
for some ranges of household income and some types of borrowers, access to loans has 
conflicting effects on school enrollment.  On the one hand, loans increase the demand for 
education as a result of income, risk-management, gender, and information effects.  On 
the other hand, credit-constrained households that cultivate land or operate labor-
intensive microenterprises discover new demands for child labor, either for farming, 
working in the microenterprise, or taking care of siblings while the mothers operate the 
new or expanded business.  Significant program and policy consequences are derived 
from these paradoxical results. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Next, we offer a  short literature review on the 
subject.  Then, we present a model that incorporates relevant determinants of education 
decisions at the rural household level.  Based on this model, we propose econometric 
specifications for the empirical test of the hypotheses.  We then use data from Bolivia for 




The relationships between education and income are complex.  In particular, the 
demand for education depends both on household preferences and on budget constraints 
that are influenced by income levels.  If a sufficiently high marginal value is placed on 
the education of family members, increases in income will result in higher expenditures 
in schooling (that is, there is a positive income elasticity of the demand for education).   
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In turn, given the labor-supply potential of children, a low household income 
increases the opportunity cost of keeping them in school.  Therefore, income levels are 
expected to positively influence the schooling decisions of poor households, while 
adverse shocks that reduce income are expected to negatively influence these decisions.  
At the same time, because the higher productivity of better-educated household members 
may be rewarded in the labor market with higher incomes, prospects about production 
and employment opportunities will influence those decisions (Duryea and Pagés, 2002). 
Human capital formation has been recognized as an effective tool for reducing 
poverty in the long run (Schultz, 1961; Bils and Klenow, 2000; Krueger and Lindahl, 
2000).  Particularly in the rural areas of developing countries, however, access to 
education is limited (Barro and Jong-Wha, 2000).  Some concerned observers highlight 
supply constraints, due to lack of infrastructure and resources ( e.g., roads, schools, 
teachers and materials).  Low schooling achievements may also reflect, however, the 
consequences, on the  demand for education, of severe budget constraints and of a 
competing demand for the youth’s labor.   
Child labor may be demanded either to fulfill the household’s basic income-
generating requirements or to take care of younger siblings, so as to facilitate the labor 
efforts of more productive household members.  Further, differential schooling outcomes 
may reflect cultural factors (e.g., the traditional division of labor and expectations about 
gender roles as well as differences in male-female preferences).  Through a number of 
channels, microfinance may influence the demands for education and for child labor. 
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Financial services (loans, payments instruments, and deposit facilities) allow rural 
households to more  fully take advantage of their productive opportunities, facilitate 
consumption smoothing in the presence of unstable and seasonal income flows, and offer 
tools for risk management when adverse income shocks occur, thereby reducing the 
vulnerability associated with poverty (Zeller and Sharma, 2002).  In turn, higher and 
particularly more stable income flows positively influence demands for schooling.  
Typically, however, information, incentive, and contract enforcement problems 
severely constrain the access  of poor rural households to formal financial markets 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 2003).  Moreover, because human capital cannot be seized and 
transferred to a lender in the event of default, it cannot be used as collateral; 
consequently, the poor must fund their educational choices out of their past wealth, 
retained earnings, or abstention from current productive work or consumption.  Because 
they are poor, the marginal cost of doing so may be prohibitively high (Ray, 1998). 
The typical shortcomings of credit markets accentuate the joint causation between 
income and human capital.  Combined with increasing returns to investment in education, 
these shortcomings generate  poverty traps (Bardhan and Udry, 1999).  Relatively 
wealthy households, able to invest in human capital, earn high incomes and remain 
wealthy.  In contrast, the poor are unable to invest in human capital, continue to earn low 
incomes, and remain poor.  To the extent to which it makes it possible to increase the 
supply of services to some poor segments of the rural population, microfinance offers, 
however, the potential to break this vicious circle, but its effects on schooling outcomes 
may be mixed.  
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Through innovations in cost-effective lending technologies, some MFOs have 
been offering mostly credit and sometimes deposit facilities for savings to segments of 
the rural population otherwise without access to formal finance (Navajas and Gonzalez-
Vega, 2002; Rodriguez-Meza and Gonzalez-Vega, 2003; Quiros, Rodriguez-Meza and 
Gonzalez-Vega, 2003).  These innovations have allowed households without traditional 
collateral to pledge their reputation in the community and the present value of their 
relationship with the MFO –based on their future ability to generate income from their 
microenterprises and on their human capital formation– as a guarantee on their loans.  
Some observers have hoped that this might be an important mechanism to influence, 
directly or indirectly, education outcomes. 
Indeed, microfinance may influence human capital formation through several 
channels.  First, it is widely recognized that income levels influence schooling (Behrman 
and Knowles, 1999).  To the extent to which microfinance may influence the growth of 
poor households’ incomes, it may influence the demand for schooling (income effect).  
Second, the vulnerability of rural households to adverse exogenous shocks and the 
volatility of their incomes influence their ability to afford the opportunity costs of 
education.  The absence of usual remedies for risk, such as borrowing and insurance 
opportunities, results in limited and costly income smoothing strategies (Deaton, 1997). 
Poor households cope with risk in various ways.  They adopt diversified production plans 
and employment and migration strategies to reduce their exposure to the risk of adverse 
income shocks, even if this entails lower average incomes (Murdoch, 1995).    
  
  6
In addition,  households smooth consumption by saving, selling assets, taking 
children out of school, and developing informal insurance and credit arrangements 
(Kanbur and Squire, 2001).   Access to loans from MFOs –particularly when emergency 
loans are offered, such as those from the internal account of village banks– reduce the 
probability that children will be withdrawn from school when adverse shocks occur.  
Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), among others, show that poor households affected by 
income shocks withdraw their children from school.  According to these authors, a 10 
percent decline in agricultural income across seasons caused a fall in school attendance of 
five days in a sample of six Indian villages.  Access to microfinance may thus improve a 
household’s ability to anticipate and cope with income shocks and may thereby influence 
the demand for education (risk-management effect).  
Third, several studies have hypothesized that, compared to men, women show a 
stronger preference for educating their children (Thomas, 1990; Sallee, 2001; Behrman 
and Rosenzweig, 2002). If preferences toward education are gender-related and if 
microfinance improves access to loans by women and, thereby, changes their power to 
influence household schooling decisions, the rate of human capital formation may be 
altered ( gender effect).  This approach substitutes a bargaining process within the 
household for the traditional unitary model of optimization of a single preference set.  
The outcome of this bargaining process reflects both gender differences in preference 
functions and in relative power in influencing household decisions (Phipps and Burton, 
1995; McElroy, 1997; Nanda, 1999).   
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Fourth,  given uncertainty about the future, imperfect information, and high 
private discount rates, household choices about education may be revised with the 
acquisition of new knowledge, which modifies intertemporal preferences or changes 
perceptions about the value of schooling (education effect).  In effect, higher levels of 
parent education have been found to positively affect schooling decisions (Lillard and 
Willis, 1994).  In particular, preferences about schooling may be influenced by adult 
training programs that highlight education as a tool for income generation and as a 
determinant of the quality of life.  
Some MFOs, as is the case of CRECER in Bolivia, hold meetings with their 
borrowers on a regular basis and take advantage of these meetings to disseminate 
information about birth control, child education, health care, and nutrition.  The influence 
of these credit-cum-education programs in improving standards of living is subject to 
great debate (MkNelly and Dunford, 1999).  An additional and important debate 
questions the optimality, from an organizational perspective, of jointly providing credit 
and other services.  On the one hand, there may be economies of scope from this joint 
provision.  On the other hand, the supply of non-financial services may jeopardize the 
pursuit of financial sustainability by the MFO, through diseconomies from overburdening 
the organization’s management capabilities or from signals that weaken borrower 
discipline (Gonzalez-Vega, 1998).  The present paper does not address these issues.  The 
analysis of the paper is, in this respect, incomplete, in that it only assesses the marginal 
value  of the supply of credit-cum-education services, but it does not measure the 
marginal cost of providing these services.   
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Fifth, there is a growing literature on the influence of the demand for child labor 
on schooling outcomes (Psacharopoulos, 1997; Jensen y Nielsen, 1997; Patrinos y 
Psacharopoulos, 1997; Grootaert y Patrinos, 1999). Additional productive activities, 
made possible by access to microfinance, may change household demands for child labor 
directly, in the newly-created or expanded microenterprises, or indirectly, in child care or 
in farm and livestock duties (child-labor demand effect). 
This paper evaluates the influence of microfinance on human capital formation by 
looking at whether children from rural households with access to credit-cum-education 
programs are kept longer in school.  To accomplish this, we assume that those who have 
been members of the program for a short period (i.e.,  less than a year) have not had 
enough time to increase their incomes or change their attitudes toward schooling.  We use 
them as a control group to compare to households with members that have received credit 
and non-formal education for longer periods.  
The assessment of impact, which involves attributing specific effects to specific 
interventions, encounters formidable methodological problems (Ravallion, 2001).  Meyer 
(2002) claims that measurement and attribution of impacts of microfinance on clients is 
the most difficult and controversial aspect in the evaluation of the performance of MFOs.  
One important dimension of these difficulties, of relevance here, is the possibility of 
selection bias.  Both the selection of clients and program placement are sources of 
concern.  The first concern arises because MFO clients will not likely be randomly 
selected; rather, they possess characteristics that are systematically different from those 
of a randomly selected sample.  
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Self-selection into the program can occur because of systematic differences in 
preferences among those who choose to participate and those who do not.  Moreover, if 
the lender uses a systematic creditworthiness screening criterion, borrowers should differ 
from non-borrowers.  Non-participants, therefore, are a non-equivalent comparison 
group.  Ignoring this source of potential endogeneity can lead to biases due to the 
omission of unobserved relevant variables (Moffitt, 1991). 
A second concern arises because MFOs choose to start operations in areas with 
specific attributes, such as communication and transportation facilities (Pitt and 
Khandker, 1998).  Programs may also be developed in localities that are either more 
dynamic than others or where the incidence of poverty is greater.  Unmeasured locality 
factors and household attributes may simultaneously affect the demand for program 
participation, women’s empowerment, and the demand for education.  This possibility of 
selection bias implies the difficulty to determine if differences between groups are due to 
the supply of microfinance services or to non-representative clients and locations. 
Our study modestly attempted to minimize these selection problems.  Client 
selection issues were addressed by using a cohort approach in the sampling process. 
Participants were separated into old clients, with more than one year in the program, for 
which benefits had already accrued, and new clients, with one year or less, which had 
successfully passed the credit screening mechanism but for which benefits would not 
have yet accrued.  Self-selection may still be present if older participants possess 
unobserved features that differ in degree from those of more recent participants.   
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The model 
Based on Schultz (1993), Lardé de Palomo and Argüello de Morera (2000) 
recognized that the late incorporation of children to the schooling system and their early 
withdrawal are mostly due to demand factors.  When parents decide about their children’s 
schooling, they chose to allocate a fraction of household income to education, according 
to their perceived profitability of schooling.  This perception depends, in turn, on the 
parents’ own level of education and on features of the economic environment.  Credit-
cum-education programs may influence these perceptions.  Behrman, Pollack, and 
Taubman (1986) further argue that resources for education are split according to the 
number of children, their gender, and their age, given household composition and the 
severity of the budget constraint.   
In the rural areas of developing countries, the demand for schooling is influenced 
by determinants of other forms of human capital that may substitute for or complement 
education and that are influenced by microfinance-cum-education programs (such as 
health and nutrition), by the productivity and diversification of sources of labor income 
(also influenced by access to microfinance), by flows of non-labor income, such as 
subsidies and remittances, and by the ownership of assets that can be used as collateral 
for loans.  Khandker (1998) found that, in Bangladesh, microloans had a significant 
impact on children's schooling, especially for boys.  The child’s gender may also matter.  
Ray (1998) notes that in 1995, for all low-income countries, there were almost twice as 
many female as there were male illiterates. 
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For the analysis of this paper, we assume that parents make decisions about 
sending their children to school from the perspective of a long-run investment.  Several 
authors have modeled schooling as an investment decision that generates a flow of 
benefits and costs over time (Becker, 1993; Glick and Sahn, 2000).  Given a household 
rate of time discount, each household perceives an expected net present value from the 
decision.  In the first period (t=0) of a simple two-period model, the household invests in 
the education of its children.  In the second period (t=1), the children grow up and the 
household reaps the benefits.   
In addition to spending on education (E), the household consumes goods and 
services during both periods (C0 and C1).  The main source of income is household labor 
(L), supplied by both parents and children, which can be sold at a wage rate w.  If the 
parents decide to educate some of the children, a proportion of the labor force, a, will not 
be available to generate income in period t=0.  In period t=1, this proportion of the labor 
force will receive a wage rate w’ (where w’>w).  In period t=0, income will be equal to 
[(1-a) w L].   In period t=1, income will be [(1-a) w L + a w’ L].  Assuming a composite 
good C, with price p=1, expenditures in period t=0 will be [C0 + E] and in period t=1 they 
will be [C1].   If in period t=0 income is low or if education expenditures are high, a small 
proportion of the children will go to school.  
Assume that the household gains access to a loan B, to be repaid in the second 
period, given an interest rate and borrower transaction costs.  We define r as the sum of 
the interest rate and per peso transaction costs.  Thus, the cash flow for period t=0 
becomes  [(1-a) w L + B], and expenditures for period t=1 become [C1 + (1+r) B].  
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Utility comes only from consumption (C0, C1).  The problem for the household is 
to choose the level of consumption for each period, Ct, the rate of schooling of the 
children a, and the optimal loan size B, in order to 
B r C L w wL E C B wL t s C C U
B C C
). 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ; ) 1 ( . . ) , (
, , ,
max
1 0 1 0
1 0
+ + = + - + = + - a a a a r
a
 (1) 
Here r is the intertemporal discount factor, given by (1/(1+d)), and d is the time 
discount rate for the household.  Solving for C0 and C1 in the budget restrictions and 
substituting into the utility function, the problem becomes 
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The first order conditions for an optimum are given by 
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The first condition implies that the marginal utility of current consumption, 
weighted by the sum of education expenses and forgone income from the last unit of 
labor used (LHS), which can be interpreted as the marginal cost of devoting a proportion 
a of the household’s labor force to education, should equal the discounted marginal 
utility of future consumption, weighted by the difference between earnings from wage 
rates for skilled and unskilled labor (RHS), which can be interpreted as the discounted 
marginal benefit of educating a proportion a of the household’s labor force.  
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The second condition implies that the marginal utility of the additional purchasing 
power from the loan in the initial period (LHS) should equal the discounted marginal 
disutility of loan repayment, given transaction costs and interest rates (RHS). 
In order to incorporate gender effects in the model, following Sallee (2002), let us 
assume that the household’s utility can be written as a Cobb-Douglas function, where the 
shares correspond to weights for females and males in the household.
1  If g represents the 
proportion of women in the household and (1-g) the proportion of men, the utility 
function can be written as: 
g g - =
1
1 0 1 0 ) , , , ( . ) , , , ( (.) B E C C U B E C C U U
M F         (5) 
Although both components of utility depend upon the household’s consumption 
and the education of the children, we assume that women have a stronger preference than 
men about the schooling.   
The model accounts for the expected effects of microfinance on schooling 
decisions.  The household’s labor supply (1-a)L and the wage levels for skilled and 
unskilled workers ( w and  w’) determine levels of income, while  a accounts for the 
demand for child labor.  The presence of B in the budget constraint accounts for the risk-
management effect (as the loan facilitates both income and consumption smoothing).  
The shares  g in the utility function account for the gender effect, while the specific 
functional form can capture the information effect. 
                                                 
1 Strictly speaking, the weights should reflect the shares of members making decisions about the 
household’s levels of consumption, education and borrowing.  
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Using the implicit function theorem, the first-order conditions imply that optimal 
demand functions for education and credit exist, namely 
  ) , , ; , , ' , ( r g a a L r E w w =             (6) 
  ) , , ; , , ' , ( r g L r E w w B B =             (7) 
The outcome of this decision-making process determines the optimal proportion 
of the household’s potential labor force to be kept out of work and into education and the 
optimal size of loan to be demanded, as functions of the opportunity cost of education 
(wage-earning activities), expected future income, education expenses, and the cost of 
credit, given parameters about household size, the importance of women in the decision-
making exercise, and the time discount rate.   
Although this is a simple model, it identifies several key variables considered by 
households when making decisions about sending their children to school.  With this 
conceptualization in mind, an econometric specification is necessary in order to capture 
the most important aspects of this model. 
 
Econometric specification 
From the first-order conditions, we see that the household decides on the amount 
of education by looking at the current marginal costs and expected future marginal 
benefits of education.  The share of household members sent to school will be positive if 
the present value of net benefits is positive and it will be an increasing function of this 
present value.   
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The net expected utility from education can be expressed as a function of a vector 
of household and child characteristics (z), observed by the researcher, and of a stochastic 
component of preferences, known to the parents but not observed by the researcher. 
Then, the expected net present value of schooling for a given child in the household 
(denoted by i) can be written as 
ENPVi = f(zi, ei)             (8) 
This latent result cannot be measured.  In its place, proxies for the potential 
determinants of the ENPV of schooling must be used.  Further, given uncertainty about 
functional form and about unknown parameters, we must reinterpret the model in terms 
of probabilities: the probability that a child will be sent to school is the probability that 
his/her parents think that the household will be better off if he/she is studying: 
Pr (schoolingi) =  Pr [f(zi, ei) > 0]         (9) 
Using the approach of the random utility model (RUM) and assuming the function 
f to be additively separable in deterministic and stochastic components (Haab and 
McConnell, 2002), the expected net present value of schooling can be written as: 
f(zi, ei)  =  h(zi) + ei             (10) 
Then, the probability of schooling can be rewritten as: 
Pr (schoolingi) =  Pr (h(zi) > ei)         (11) 
According to the RUM, we can regress a binary dependent variable (yi = 1 if the 
child is studying, yi = 0 if the child is not studying) against the vector of observable and 
deterministic variables zi.   
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This specification has a drawback, however; we have to consider the possibility 
that, if the child is attending school this year, it does not mean that he/she had been able 
to attend during previous years.  Therefore, a more dynamic framework is needed to 
capture the accumulated performance of each child. 
The dependent variable used for the empirical estimation of the model is the 
education gap, measured as the number of years of the difference between the highest 
level of education actually completed by the child and the expected level of education, 
















education Expected         (12) 
The education gap is then defined as: 
Education gap = max {0, expected education – actual education}    (13) 
If the child successfully stayed at school up to the end of secondary education, the 
gap is zero.  If she/he encountered problems (such as late entry, failed grades, or 
desertion), the gap is a positive number.  If she/he never attended school, the gap is the 
level of expected education according to her/his age.  As attendance to primary school is 
widespread, only children between 13 and 18 years old are considered in the analysis.  
Because the dependent variable is a positive integer number, the estimation is 
specified as a count model, rather than as of ordinary least squares.  To take into account 
the possibility of over-dispersion, all the estimations are adjusted through a negative 
binomial regression model.  We use, therefore, a Poisson maximum likelihood regression 
with over-dispersion.   
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The explanatory variables, namely the vector z, described in detail in the Annex, 
include variables required by the model and some control variables.  The function h can 
be written as 
hi(zi) = f (Ii, Hi, Fi, Ni, Ei)           (14) 
where Ii refers to individual characteristics of the ith child (age, gender, position 
among his/her siblings). These are control variables expected to influence education 
achievements;  
Hi refers to characteristics, for the ith child, of her/his household’s wealth (i.e., 
levels of education of working members, area of arable lands, and poverty, measured 
with an index of basic needs satisfaction).  The level of schooling of working household 
members, a proxy for the stock of human wealth, is expected to improve the educational 
achievements of children.  This variable can be used to reflect the household’s income-
earning capacity as well as perceptions about returns to education.  Landholdings are a 
proxy for physical wealth and also reflect the potential demand for farm labor within the 
household.  The index of basic needs satisfaction is a proxy for access to health facilities 
and other public services, such as potable water (i.e., social wealth); 
Ni refers to the environment surrounding the ith child (i.e., a household living in a 
departmental capital, other urban center or a rural area);  
Ei refers to empowerment, related to the importance of women in the decision-
making process of the household of the ith child (i.e., the proportion of the household’s 
human capital held by working women).  This variable captures the effect of the 
parameter g in the specification of the demand for education; and  
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Fi refers to access to microfinance-cum-education, measured by the length of time 
a member of the household of the i-th child has been in the program (old versus new 
clients of CRECER).  This variable is used to test for the impact of microfinance-cum-
education on the schooling achievements of children. 
 
The data 
Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America.  Deep inequalities and 
poor quality characterize its education outcomes.  The average number of years of 
schooling completed declined from 4.2 in 1960 to 4.0 in 1980 and then increased to 5.5 in 
2000 (Barro and Jong-Wha, 2000).  Productivity and wages are very low for a large share 
of the working population.  Over 45 percent of urban male workers earn less than US$1 
(PPP) a day (Duryea and Pagés, 2002). 
In turn, over the past 15 years, Bolivia has experienced a strong development of 
microfinance (González-Vega and Rodríguez-Meza, 2002).  MFOs, originally developed 
as employment-generation tools for excluded sectors of society, have grown into a 
competitive and sustainable segment of the Bolivian financial system.  Outreach toward 
the rural areas is, however, limited.  
The available dataset is made up of the results of two household surveys.  One  
survey investigated households of microfinance clients of CRECER and SARTAWI in 
the municipality of Batallas (April 2001).  This dataset includes 130 households, mainly 
from the countryside of the municipality (Romero, 2002).   
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The second dataset (November 2000) resulted from a survey of households of 
CRECER clients  in five departments (Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, and 
Potosi).  This dataset includes 427 households and about half of the sample comes from 
rural areas.  Although the two surveys were designed with different purposes, they share 
the same structure.  A large number of the same questions were asked in both cases. 
For the analysis of education achievements, the children in school age (7 to 18 
years old) were divided into two groups: primary-school children (7 to 12 years old) and 
high-school children (13 to 18 years old).  The distribution of the sample is shown in 
Table 1.  Tests with the sub-sample of children between 7 and 12 years old, a fairly 
homogeneous group, did not reveal any key significant differences.  This paper focuses, 
therefore, on the sub-sample of children between 13 and 18 years old.   
The results for the dependent variable, the education gap, are reported in Table 2. 
For the two samples, 56 percent of all children in school age show some education gap.  
The gap is larger among those 13 to 18 years old, with 66 percent of the sub-sample 
showing a gap.  The CRECER dataset for five departments (national sample) shows 60 
percent of all children and 71 percent of the 13-18 year old group with a gap.  Most of the 
gaps correspond to one or two years of delay, with few cases of total abandonment of 
studies. 
Based on years of education for each working member in the household, human 
capital indicators are presented in Table 3.  The same table shows information about the 
participation of women in the labor force.  Main statistics for the sub-sample of children 
in high school age (13 to 18 years old), by department, are presented in Table 4.   
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Results 
The regression analysis examines the dependence of the education gap on the 
explanatory variables.  The regressions test for the difference in education gaps between 
households that have had access to credit-cum-education (CRECER) for more than one 
year versus households with members with less experience in the program.  The 
hypothesis is that access to credit and non-formal adult education makes a marginal 
difference in the size of the education gap.  The results are shown in Table 5. 
For the case of the national sample, the independent variable for access to credit is 
the number of months that the client had been a member of CRECER until the date of the 
survey.  We do not have this information for the Batallas sample; instead, the sample was 
designed to include old clients –members for two years or more– and new clients –
members for up to one year.  For this sample, the independent variable is a dummy taking 
the value of one for old clients and of zero for new clients.  The Batallas sample included 
134 youths 13 to 18 years old, while the national sample included 346 youths.  
In both cases, the coefficient for the microfinance program variable is negative 
and statistically significant (at the five-percent level for Batallas and ten-percent level for 
the national sample).  The null hypothesis can thus be rejected.  It appears that, ceteris 
paribus, children from households with a longer history of affiliation to microfinance 
programs have a greater chance of being kept longer in school in contrast to children 
from households just entering the program.  
As expected, the coefficient for the variable age is significant and positive.  That 
is, the older the child, the greater the probability that she/he will show an education gap.  
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The coefficient for the variable gender is positive although not significant.  This 
is an important result.  Lack of statistical significance means that there are no differences 
between girls and boys in their educational achievements.  The results cannot show if this 
gender neutrality has been due to the influence of the MFO or not. 
The  position of the child compared to her/his siblings shows a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the education gap, supporting the hypothesis that 
position matters and that first daughters/sons are more likely to be sent to school than 
younger siblings. 
The household’s  human capital (the a verage level of education of working 
members) significantly reduces the education gap.  More educated household decision-
makers have a greater propensity to encourage the education of their children.  This may 
be facilitated by the higher incomes earned by more educated household workers. 
The coefficient on agricultural land holdings is positive and significant.  Farming 
appears to be a substitute or competition for education.  This presents policymakers with 
a paradoxical result: increased opportunities to farm may pull children away from school. 
To the extent to which farming households tend to be the poorest, this may create a 
poverty trap for these households. 
The coefficient for the poverty index is significant and shows the expected sign. 
That is, households with the least satisfaction of basic needs have children with greater 
education gaps.  This reflects the high opportunity cost of the child’s school attendance in 
households with a low productivity of labor and a tight budget constraint.  In the absence 
of other productive household assets, expected returns from education also appear low.    
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The  empowerment variable shows a significant coefficient for the Batallas 
sample, but it brings multicolineality with several independent variables in the national 
sample.  For this reason, it was dropped from the corresponding regression.  For the 
Batallas regression, the coefficient for empowerment is negative and statistically 
significant.  This indicates that the empowerment of women reduces the education gap 
for high-school children. 
The dummy variables used to control for the type of household (rural, other 
urban, or departmental capital) are not significant at the 10-percent level.  They are 
necessary, however, to provide consistency to the regression and to  account for 
differences among  types of household.  For instance, if they are dropped from the 
regression, the coefficient related to landholdings becomes not significant, as 
landholdings have a different impact on rural than on urban households.  For rural 
households, landholdings are a factor of production, which generate demands for the 
household members’ labor, while for urban households land ownership mostly reflects 
wealth.  Demands for child labor may still emerge in urban households if the children are 
asked to help in the microenterprise activities or help with childcare. 
Over-dispersion was observed in both regressions, leading to the conclusion that 
the negative binomial regression model was the appropriate choice.  With this method, 





Poverty in Bolivia is dramatic, reducing standards of living not only for the 
current but also for the future generation.  In the long term, the alleviation of poverty will 
require substantial improvements in education.  This requires overcoming constraints 
from the supply as well as the demand side.  The demand side of the education equation 
seems to be influenced by the attitudes, opportunities, and constraints of poor rural 
household members.  Our results confirm this perspective.  If a clear diagnosis is a 
precondition for the adoption of appropriate policies, important lessons, corroborated 
elsewhere, emerge from this study.  Its results suggest that programs that improve the 
income-generating capacity of households and their ability to withstand adverse shocks 
can positively shift the demand for education. 
Consistent with the threat of a poverty trap, deeper levels of poverty are 
associated with lower demands for education.  The results for the index of basic needs 
satisfaction in all cases confirm a significant and unfavorable influence of poverty on 
education gaps.  Educated household workers generate a stronger demand for the 
education of household children than non-educated household members do.  Larger 
stocks of human capital are not only associated with higher household incomes but also 
with more optimistic perceptions about the returns from education.  These outcomes 
reinforce the prediction of a poverty trap: more educated parents demand more education 
for their children.  Non-formal adult education, through MFO credit-cum-education 
programs, may in part offset these attitudes.  
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The relationship between wealth levels and the demand for education may create, 
however, some policy dilemmas.  First, greater access to land and, therefore, to 
opportunities for farming appear to increase the household’s demand for child labor, as 
participants in the household’s own productive activities.  Land tenure policies, therefore, 
while increasing income opportunities for the household may, at the same time, increase 
the opportunity cost of keeping children at school.  Similar effects might be created with 
the encouragement of household microenterprises.   
Larger stocks of capital or land assets make these households search for additional 
labor inputs, given the highly labor-intensive technologies they use.  The first source to 
fill this demand for labor is the family, thereby creating a trade-off between potential 
future welfare and the satisfaction of current needs.  Even when household members are 
aware of some advantages from educating their children, given their precarious 
conditions they may be forced to sacrifice the potential flow of future benefits in order to 
compensate for extremely low current income flows.  If, further, there is the perception 
that current employment options do not reward investments in education, the best 
alternative is to keep children at the farm or microenterprise since their early ages.   
Unfortunately, at low levels of household income, this adverse impact of 
incentives to agricultural production and microenterprise development on the demand for 
education will be inevitable.  Agricultural intensification policies, rather than land 
extensification, which substantially increase the productivity of available household labor 
and other resources and improve the returns on human capital, may be the only way out 
of this dilemma.  
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Another challenge presented by this dilemma is the demand of youth labor for 
childcare.  As the nascent microenterprise demands the attention of older women in the 
household, an internal demand for childcare emerges, and this demand will be met by 
keeping older children at home.  This effect will be stronger in younger families, because 
of the larger number of toddlers and the smaller number of adults in the household.  The 
education component of microfinance programs may have an impact on the spacing of 
pregnancies and on the fertility rates of these women, and this may contribute to a 
reduction of this paradoxical threat to human capital formation (Romero, 2002). 
The regression results imply a significant influence from the relationship with the 
MFO on the demand for schooling.  Most likely, the most important influences of 
participation in the MFO program operate through the  income  and  risk-management 
channels.  The paper does not test, however, for the influence of the loans on household 
incomes and consumption smoothing strategies.  Given the strong theoretical and 
empirical relationship between household income and the demand for education, 
nevertheless, to the extent to which these loans may have an influence on the level and 
stability of household incomes, this will be a strong channel for their influence on 
education gaps.  
Additional positive impacts are generally associated with greater women 
empowerment.  In general, women in the sample are aware of the threats to their 
children’s education opportunities (Romero, 2002).  The precise channel linking 
empowerment, access to credit, and a demand for education is yet to be determined.  
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We could not test for the influence of adult education in increasing awareness of 
the importance of schooling,  as our results cannot separate the effects of the non-formal 
education component from those of the credit component.  
A clear policy recommendation acknowledges the importance of access to credit 
and other financial services that allow households to postpone or smooth their 
consumption, in increasing their investment in education.  MFOs in Bolivia have been 
able to reach segments of the rural population that otherwise would not have had access 
to these services and, to the extent to which they are cost-effective, this is a valuable 
development contribution.  The sustainability and cost-effectiveness of these MFOs has 
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Annex 1. Variables used 





§ Age: measures the child’s age in years. The expected sign is positive; the older 
the child, the more likely that she/he will show an education gap. This is a control 
variable. 
 
§ Gender: this is an instrumental (dummy) variable that takes the value of zero if 
the child is a boy, and the value of one if the child is a girl. The expected sign is 
positive, under the hypothesis that, within the Aymara culture, the value of the 
girls’ education is less than the value of the boys’ education; girls should show a 
larger education gap. 
 
§ Position. This variable assigns the value of one to the oldest child in the 
household, two to the next, and so on. When there are granddaughters/ grandsons 
in the household, the value of one is again assigned to the oldest child, two to the 
second one, and so on. A positive relationship between this variable and the gap is 
expected, under the assumption that the oldest children are more likely to be kept 




§ Human capital. This variable is measured as the number of years of schooling 
accumulated by the workers of the household divided by the number of workers. 
The expected sign is negative, under the hypothesis that if the workers (who 
usually make decisions about the children’s education) have higher levels of 
education, they will have a stronger preference for schooling and the gap will be 
smaller. Also, the level of the workers' human capital is an indicator of their 
income-generating capacity and, therefore, of their ability to pay for education 
expenses.  
 
§ Own arable lands. This variable shows the size of the plots of land owned by the 
household and used for crops or other productive activities, measured in hectares. 
The sign will be positive if, when the household owns land, it is likely that it will 
demand the child’s labor time for farming activities, in competition with school 
time. The sign may be negative, however, if the variable influences education 





§ Poverty Index. This variable is based on the poverty index used in Navajas et al. 
(2000), adopted from the 1992 Mapa de Pobreza for Bolivia. For each household, 
the index of minimum satisfaction of basic needs (health, access to public 
services, such as water and electricity, housing materials and overcrowding, and 
literacy and education) was used here with a special adjustment; the education 
component of the original index was dropped, in order to avoid endogeneity 
problems in the estimation.  The expected sign is negative; the higher the index of 
basic needs satisfaction, the less poor the household is estimated to be, and the 
smaller the expected education gap will be. The assumption is that greater poverty 
increases the opportunity cost of keeping children at school and that it also 




§ Type of household.  This variable considers the difference between household 
living in the rural areas, the urban areas, and capital cities. It is constructed 
through dummy variables. Capital cities is the dropped variable in the 
econometric analysis. It can be expected for the rural dummy to be positive 
compared to the control (capital cities) if the hypothesis is that rural areas are less 
likely to have children with good educational performance. For the urban non-
capital cities compared to the capital cities there is no expected sign. 
 
Financial program characteristics: 
 
§ Old client. For the Batallas clients, the survey was designed in order to compare 
new clients (less than one year) with old clients (more than two years). This 
differentiation was used in the regression analysis incorporating a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one for old clients. 
§ Months of affiliation to CRECER. For the national Crecer dataset, the variable to 
measure exposure to the credit was the computed amount of months that the 




§ Human capital held by worker women. This variable measures the proportion of 
the accumulated human capital ￿measured by the number of years of 
schooling￿ held by the women who work in each household. The expected sign 
is negative to assert that empowerment reduces the educational gap. There was 
some doubts that this variable would be correlated with human capital variable, 
but the relationship was weak. 
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Table 1. Composition of samples by age of household member and type of borrower 
  AGE  RURALITY 
  7 to 12  13 to 18  7 to 18 
Other 
ages 
Total  Capital  Urban  Rural  Total 
SARTAWI 
Batallas 
71  68  139  219  358      358  358 
CRECER 
Batallas 
78  67  145  261  406      406  406 
Total Survey 1  149  135  284  480  764      764  764 
CRECER 
Chuquisaca 
28  21  49  86  135  114  0  21  135 
CRECER 
Cochabamba 
126  100  226  467  693  108  277  308  693 
CRECER 
La Paz 
134  147  281  520  801  0  227  574  801 
CRECER 
Oruro 
90  75  165  361  526  382  25  119  526 
CRECER 
Potosí 
16  13  29  58  87  0  61  26  87 
Total Survey 2  394  356  750  1492  2242  604  590  1048  2242 
Total Two 
surveys 
543  491  1034  1972  3006  604  590  1812  3006 
Source: client household surveys  
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Table 2. Education gaps in the sample of children, according to age groups. 
Batallas  CRECER  TOTAL 
Educational 
Gap (years)  7 to 12 
13 to 
18 
7 to 18  7 to 12 
13 to 
18 
7 to 18  7 to 12 
13 to 
18 
































































































































































































































Total  149  135  284  394  355  749  543  490  1,033 
Source: client household surveys  
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Observations (households)  23  130  154  104  16  427  130 
Household size  5.9  5.3  5.2  5.0  5.4  5.2  5.9 
Workers   2.6  2.2  3.2  2.6  2.1  2.7  3.9 
Female workers  1.1  1.2  1.7  1.4  1.1  1.4  2.1 
Household human capital   22.6  27.6  24.9  27.7  34.3  26.6  27.6 
Female human capital   10.1  14.5  11.2  14.4  12.7  13.0  11.6 
Workers human capital  11.3  15.3  18.9  19.4  15.0  17.4  22.7 
Female workers human 
capital 
4.3  7.6  7.9  9.2  6.6  7.9  10.0 
Average household human 
capital 
3.6  5.2  4.7  5.5  6.0  5.0  4.9 
Average workers human 
capital 
4.4  7.0  6.0  7.4  7.4  6.6  5.8 
Average female workers 
human capital  
7.8  12.0  7.6  10.8  11.3  9.8  5.8 
Women human capital / 
household human capital 
0.50  0.53  0.43  0.53  0.48  0.49  0.43 
Female workers human 
capital / Household 
workers human capital 
0.37  0.50  0.42  0.53  0.51  0.47  0.44 
Female workers  / 
household workers 
0.47  0.58  0.54  0.60  0.56  0.56  0.54 
Source: client household surveys  
  37





La Paz  Oruro  Potosí  CRECER  BATALLAS 
Observations  21  100  146  75  13  355  135 
Education gap 
3.0  1.9  2.3  1.9  2.8  2.2  1.8 
Age 
15.2  15.5  15.4  15.4  15.5  15.4  15.3 
Gender 
0.5  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.6  0.5 
Household size 
7.1  6.5  6.9  6.3  6.7  6.7  6.8 
Number of students in the 
household 
3.0  3.4  3.4  3.3  4.0  3.4  3.6 
Number of children in the 
household 
3.8  3.9  4.1  3.5  3.2  3.9  4.1 
Position of child in the family 
2.5  2.2  2.5  2.4  3.1  2.4  2.1 
Average human capital of  
family members 
3.9  5.9  5.3  6.5  6.9  5.7  5.3 
Average human capital of  
family workers 
4.1  6.7  5.7  7.6  7.8  6.4  5.8 
Holdings of land 
0.6  0.3  2.8  2.8  0.0  1.8  1.4 
Basic needs satisfaction index 
1.0  1.0  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.8 
Distance to school 
15.6  12.0  24.2  11.7  7.7  17.2  30.0 
Proportion living in capital 
cities 
0.9  0.1  0.0  0.7  0.0  6.0  0.0 
Proportion living in other 
urban centers 
0.0  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.7  4.0  0.0 
Proportion living in rural areas 
0.1  0.5  0.8  0.2  0.3  1.0  1.0 
Proportion of old clients  0.1  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.4 
Months of affiliation 
3.3  19.3  21.7  12.6  12.6  17.8  N/A 
Human capital of female 
workers 
9.6  17.8  10.3  15.0  12.8  13.4  6.3 
Working women as a fraction 
of total workers 
0.42  0.59  0.53  0.58  0.44  0.55  0.53 
HK of women as a fraction of 
HK of household 
0.52  0.59  0.45  0.55  0.38  0.51  0.42 
HK of worker women as a 
fraction of HK of total 
workers 
0.38  0.53  0.40  0.52  0.37  0.46  0.43 
Source: client household surveys 
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Table 5. Results of regressions.  
Dep. Var. EDU GAP  Batallas  Crecer 




-0.63  0.28  0.03  -0.01  0.00  0.08 
Age  0.21  0.08  0.01  0.15  0.04  0.00 
Gender  0.04  0.26  0.89  0.10  0.13  0.46 
Position        0.15  0.05  0.01 
Household human 
capital 
-0.02  0.01  0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.00 
Poverty Index  -0.89  0.54  0.10  -0.66  0.30  0.03 
Land holdings  0.10  0.05  0.08  0.00  0.01  0.79 
Female workers 
human capital  
-0.10  0.04  0.01       
Urban dummy
3        -0.26  0.19  0.16 
Rural dummy        0.14  0.16  0.38 
Constant  -1.02  1.30  0.43  -1.01  0.69  0.15 
Overdispersion  1.12  0.28  0.00  0.91  0.12  0.00 
Number of obs.  134  346 
LR chi2(k)  30.02  31.84 
Prob. > chi2  0.00  0.00 
Pseudo R2  0.06  0.02 
 
                                                 
2 For Batallas regressions, the variable is a dummy with value one for old clients. For CRECER 
regressions, the variable is the number of months as a client 
3 The excluded variable is Departmental Capital. 